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Although not an outcome of the end of the cold war, intelligence cooperation has evolved 
significantly after the fall of the iron curtain. The twenty first century’s security environment is 
variegated, unpredictable and extremely dynamic. Poverty, corruption, isolation of minorities, 
failed states, organized crime, terrorism, pandemic disease, natural disasters, climate change are 
but a few security dangers, which not only are in a perpetual transformation, but are also 
interlocking and overlapping, showing how volatile the boundaries between these menaces are.1 
The geographic borders between countries are no longer fixed, although this is what the terrorists 
want the governments to think: the actual borders are ‘delineated’ by terrorist activities, 
organized crime, and money laundering.  
 
It is difficult for governments, even if possessing superb intelligence collection and 
analysis assets, to fight these threats, without adjusting and cooperating. For example, despite the 
United States’ unparalleled defense and intelligence capabilities, the lack of coordination and 
cooperation among all security agencies, on the one hand, and superficial international 
cooperation, resulted in the 9/11 intelligence ‘failure’.2 Terrorist groups are complex, easily 
adjustable systems or networks, which governments are not; to effectively avert current threats, 
government institutions (including intelligence) need to become less closed and more 
cooperative and flexible systems/networks.3 It was the cooperation of British intelligence and 
law enforcement organizations that lead to the prevention of the ‘liquid bomb’ terrorist threat in 
August 2006. Grappling with such complex dangers requires more coordination and information 
sharing at the national level (i.e. among intelligence, law enforcement, and judiciary), 
establishing partnerships with civil society and the media, as well as enhancing cooperation with 
partner (or even enemy) nations’ intelligence communities, yet without endangering or 
disclosing intelligence agencies’ sources and methods, used to accomplish either their shared or 
distinct goals. To this end, concepts such as ‘interagency cooperation’, ‘information and 
intelligence sharing’, ‘need to share versus need to know’, ‘intelligence partnerships’, 
‘collective/cooperative security’, and ‘security is everyone’s business’, have become pointers for 
national security strategies, intelligence doctrines, intelligence reform, education and training, 
and international alliances, as an attempt to fill in a gap resulted from the post cold-war transition 
from a ‘puzzle intelligence’ (visualizing the answers) to a ‘mystery intelligence’ (not knowing or 
visualizing the answers).  
 
In this context, the traumatic events on the September 11, 2001 in the United States, 
instated a sense of urgency to reform intelligence, create networks, intelligence sharing 
mechanisms or fusion centers, to avoid future failures. At the international level, on 14 March 
2003, EU and NATO signed an agreement on the security of information, as a precondition for 
intelligence sharing between the two institutions. As in other transformation endeavors, the 
process of instituting and strengthening interagency cooperation has been cumbersome. In 2003, 
statistics revealed that information sharing between the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) remained 
restricted, with FBI keeping its intelligence to itself. Internationally, the information/intelligence 
flow is not always equal: analysts revealed that some countries want to get all the information 
they ask from their partner countries’ intelligence communities, without returning the favor: for 
example US shares with India only intelligence useful to India to deal with terrorists, and not 
intelligence that may help India strengthen its case against Pakistan as a State-sponsor of 
terrorism. On the other hand, not all intelligence sharing and cooperative efforts are equally 
welcomed by nations: for instance, the ratification in 2008 of the proposed EU Lisbon Reform 
Treaty concerned the American policymakers, who fear it could seriously endanger transatlantic 
intelligence and homeland security cooperation, in that by shifting additional law and justice 
roles and missions from the individual EU states to EU institutions, the treaty could destroy 
current bilateral ties and connections between US and EU governments. Notwithstanding, the 
increase in intelligence sharing and cooperation since 9/11 has been responsible for successful 
outcomes in the war against terrorism. 4 
 
 Intelligence cooperation is not a new concept for Romania’s intelligence system either, 
but its purpose, after the demise of the communist regime, is different: it shifted from ensuring 
the security of the regime (to the detriment of the population) to the security of the country (in 
the service of the population). It is very well known that Romania’s communist intelligence 
apparatus (the Securitate) collaborated with the military and/or other components of the police, 
as well as with international organized crime and terrorism groups (including the cold war 
terrorist Carlos ‘the Jackal’), in order to achieve its pernicious goals against Romanians. But 
today, the intelligence community understands that ‘security is everyone’s business’ and 
cooperates with its national and international partners to fight the national, regional, and global 
security threats. Romania is at the beginning of such cooperative process, but, hopefully, not at 
the end.  
 
This paper assesses Romania’s intelligence cooperative endeavors after the end of 
communism in 1989 and transition to democracy. First, it reviews the legal framework specific 
to interagency cooperation. Then, it addresses both the challenges and achievements of existent 
mechanisms undertaken to institute and improve cooperation, not only at national but also at 
international level. It should be noted that there is little in-depth information on how interagency 
cooperation works (i.e. with regard to collection or analysis) to enable researchers to properly 
quantify intelligence cooperation in post-communist Romania. Nevertheless, given the available 
information on the legal framework on cooperation, as well as the findings on coordination and 
cooperation within the National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT), exchanging information 
among intelligence and security institutions, collaboration in developing specific national 
security documents, and providing mutual assistance, one could argue that the intelligence 




Romanian Intelligence Community Cooperation Efforts: Per Aspera ad Astra 
 
CURRENT THREATS TO ROMANIA’S SECURITY 
 
Romania is currently confronting dangers deriving from poverty, corruption, failed states 
in the former Soviet Union region, organized crime, money laundering, terrorism, pandemic 
disease, natural disasters and others. It does not have a ‘direct’ Muslim threat (as is the case of 
the United States or United Kingdom) since, on the one hand, the Muslim/Arab population in 
Romania is better integrated in the society than in other countries, and, on the other hand, there is 
a warm relationship between Romania and Arab world going back to cold war. Even so, 
Romania’s friendly relations with the United States, the implementation of the Treaty on 
relocation of US military bases in Romania in late 2007, and the participation of the Romanian 
troops in the war on terrorism and other peace operations,5 could make Romania a target.  
 
Thus, Romania unquestionably needs a concerted mechanism of intelligence, law 
enforcement and judicial efforts to cope with these threats. Likewise, Romania’s IC needs to 
contribute, together with other nations to the regional and global security.  
 
THE CURRENT ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
 
• The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI)  
• The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE)  
• The Guard and Protection Service (SPP) 
• The Special Telecommunication Service (STS)  
• The Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Directorate for General Information of the Armed 
Forces (DGIA) 
• The Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform’s (MIRA) General Directorate for 
Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI) 
 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND COOPERATION 
 
The primary documents that provide for interagency cooperation in the field of national 
security are: the Constitution of Romania, the Law on National Security, the National Security 
Strategy, the Doctrine of Intelligence, Doctrine of Combating Terrorism, Military Strategy and 
Doctrine, and other. 
 
Robust Legal Basis 
 
Adopted in 1991 and revised in 2003, Romania’s Constitution is the basic legislative 
document stipulating interagency coordination and cooperation with regard to national defense 
and security. Article 119 of the 2003 Constitution specifies the existence of  coordinating body – 
the National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT), which is tasked to “unitarily organize and 
coordinate the activities concerning the country's defense and security, its participation in 
international security keeping, and in collective defense in military alliance systems, as well as in 
peace keeping or restoring missions.”6  
 
The National Security Law number 51/1991 restates interagency cooperation, including 
the attributions of CSAT, in that according to the law, all governmental, public and private 
organizations are required to provide information and/or support to the agencies responsible for 
national security (SRI, SIE, SPP, MIRA, MOD), and CSAT coordinates national security 
organizations.7 
 
Adopted by CSAT by Resolution number 62 of 17 April 2006, the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) stipulates that the prevention and countering of Romania’s security and safety is 
the collective and interdependent responsibility of a great number of security institutions and 
agencies, including: public administration, public order, civil emergency, border security and 
coast guard, defense, intelligence, money laundering, customs, and others. As concerns 
international cooperation, the NSS stipulates cooperation with allies and partners based on national 
programs, EU security strategy and NATO strategic concepts, based on harmonizing national efforts 
with international engagements. 8  
 
Romania’s National Doctrine of Security Intelligence, adopted by CSAT in July 2004, 
provides for coordination, cooperation and collaboration on security and intelligence matters, 
domestically and internationally, based on protocols, programs, projects or intelligence 
operations.9 
 
COOPERATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 




Even with a fairly solid legal framework for cooperation, instituting and strengthening 
interagency cooperation in the security field in Romania has been an onerous process, due to a 
number of reasons. First, the Romanian intelligence agencies are bureaucratic institutions, with 
specific internal regulations. SRI’s former director Timofte explained in an interview that if SRI 
needed specific or detailed information regarding a specific person or car or merchandise coming 
into Romania, the agency had to request said information in writing from either MIRA or 
Customs, sent them through SRI currier and then wait for the response up to 30 days.10 Second, 
Romania had, for a long time, too many intelligence agencies, fact that affected their 
effectiveness, in general, and cooperation, in particular, at least at first: overlapping/duplication 
of roles and missions gave rise to dishonest competition and rivalry. SRI employees asserted on 
certain occasions that DGIPI was not a legitimate intelligence agency and there was no need for 
it in the IC system. This rivalry between SRI and DGIPI may be due to both organizations’ 
responsibilities in the sectors of organized crime, economic crime or corruption.11 Protracted 
fighting existed between DGIPI and SRI, which often resulted in disclosure of specific actions.12 
The press revealed the notorious cases of surveillance (‘Terasa Anda’ and ‘Capitanul Soare’ ) of 
some journalists who were not pro-Iliescu, actions that were attributed to SRI but which, were in 
fact framed for SRI by DGIPI.13 SRI officials mentioned the need for a ‘more systematic 
cooperation’ with DGIA.14 SPP had trouble establishing partnerships with its counterparts 
because they regarded it as a ‘pretentious’ service, because it works for high ranked politicians, 
and it took a while for its leadership and personnel to improve communication and collaboration 
with the other services.15 Another negative aspect in this context comes from the fact that SRI 
has the monopoly on all types of telephone surveillance in that any legal surveillance is 
monitored by SRI. According to Ziua daily, SIE, DGIPI, DGIA, among other agencies - not at all 
happy with SRI ‘knowing’ their business (since all interceptions assigned to these institutions go 
through SRI servers) - purchased their own illegal surveillance devices (the ‘famous’ GSM 
Briefcases) that enabled them to intercept mobile telephones on their own (which, of course, they 
deny either having or using).16 In addition, despite the overall excellent intelligence cooperation 
during the kidnapping of three Romanian journalists in 2005, the domestic and foreign 
intelligence services disliked the presence of a Romanian general in the crisis cell, nor were they 
happy, later on, with the appointment of two generals (one of them former director of DGIA) as 
head and, respectively, deputy head of Romania’s National Intelligence Community (CNI) 
(which will be discussed later in this article).17 Third, attempts to politicize the intelligence also 
held back the process of interagency cooperation and fueled rivalries among services. As one 
journalist explains, ‘special services are used as political weapons and classified/confidential 
information, as ammunition.’18 Fourth, the lack of feedback from the intelligence consumers 
hinders the flow of information from the IC to the beneficiaries. Former SIE director Claudiu 
Saftoiu explained in an interview that the intelligence agencies are frustrated because the prime 
minister’ cabinet does not open all intelligence briefs, arguing that intelligence consumers expect 
the daily informative briefs to represent the ‘truth of facts’ and not important pieces of a ‘puzzle’ 
of those facts, which the consumers need to assess on a regular basis.19 Last (and most probably 
not least), the establishment of a CNI, although an idea put forward during previous 
administrations,20 had not been possible until president Basescu’s term (2004-2009), due to 
Romania’s scrappy politics (constant fights between the president and prime minister with regard 
to lion share of intelligence community, a consequence of the semi presidential system) on the 
one hand, and reluctance of heads of intelligence agencies, on the other hand. Deputy and 
secretary of the SRI Oversight Committee, Ion Stan, argued that there was no political will to 
elaborate and adopt a legal basis for CNI and the intelligence agencies did their best to delay 
such law which would impose specific constraints on their roles and missions.21 Moreover, the 
continuity of former Securitate personnel in all intelligence services entailed vehement criticism 
from the public opinion, which was suspicious of a ‘return of the Securitate’, and in 
consequence, the idea was abandoned.22 
 
 Cooperative Efforts 
 
Despite these challenges, the Romanian intelligence agencies have been working toward 
becoming a community, acting jointly to prevent and counter dangers to Romania's national 
security.  
 
The Role of the National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT) 
 
The main instrument of cooperation and coordination is the National Defense Supreme 
Council (CSAT), whose intelligence-related responsibilities involve the following: informing 
and advising the president on issues pertaining to national security and defense; coordinating the 
activities of all security institutions; producing security related documents (for example, the 
national security strategy and the military strategy); integrating all information provided by the 
intelligence agencies and other national security institutions.23 CSAT is composed of ten 
members: the nonpartisan president as chair, the prime minister as deputy chair, the minister of 
industry and trade, the minister of defense, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, 
the head of the Political Analysis Department of the Presidency, the director of the Romanian 
Intelligence Service (SRI), the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), and the chief of 
staff). The Council builds on a cooperative decision-making process; its members take decisions 
through consensus, with the President proposing a solution to the items debated on the agenda 
and the CSAT members voting, According to researchers, up to date, all CSAT resolutions 
received consensus.24 This is an important indicator that the members are willing to work 
together for Romania’s national security. Moreover, CSAT meetings are not exclusive to its 
members; whenever necessary, CSAT invites representatives of the parliament, public 
administration, NGOs, and other public institutions working in the security field, as well as civil 
society, with the president’s approval.25 
 
In order to ensure better coordination of the large number of agencies involved in 
national security and defense, reforming the intelligence agencies, and to better link the 
intelligence product to policy, CSAT created in 2005 a National Intelligence Community (CNI) – 
which will be addressed separately - to include representatives from all Romania’s intelligence 
agencies with the view of integrating and coordinating the intelligence process.  
 
 Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation Agreements 
 
In compliance with the legislation listed above, all public and private institutions are 
required to hand data and information to the intelligence agencies.26 Nevertheless, in order to 
improve cooperation and coordination, the Intelligence agencies have established a series of 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation protocols among themselves and with outsiders (not only 
state agencies but also NGOs and other civil society groups), with responsibilities in the security 
field. A general cooperation protocol was approved by CSAT among the SRI, SIE, SPP, STS, 
MIRA and MOD, to facilitate the operational exchange and sharing of information among all 
agencies.27 SIE cooperates with other security institutions through various mechanisms, 
including exchanging operational intelligence of mutual interest, based on specific protocols.28 
SPP has a mutual cooperation agreement with SRI; a concrete example of cooperation is their 
working together immediately after the election of president Basescu, to clarify and counter (in 
case they were true) the repeated death threats toward the new president. 29 In order to counter 
trans border crime, border police established cooperation protocols with the Ministry of Interior 
structures, SPP, MOD and SRI (mutual assistance, joint operations and information, data and 
intelligence sharing). 30 Likewise, there is a mutual exchange of information between judicial 
institutions and IC, based on legislation. In this context, the agencies have the obligation to let 
the Directorate for Investigation of Organized Crime and Terrorism Crimes (DIICOT) personnel 
know about organized crime or terrorist crimes, as well as to make DIICOT available 
intelligence and raw information related to the cases DIICOT work on.31 There is a protocol of 
cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and the Romanian Patriarchy with regard to 
organized crime.32 
 
Specific collaborative measures have been approved and implemented in Romania 
following the atrocious attacks on the United States Territory on the September 11, 2001. A 
National System on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, was established in Romania in 2001 
(operational in 2002), as an integrated structure focusing on prevention and countering terrorist 
threats. SRI is the technical authority within the System and CSAT is the strategic coordinator. 
In 2001, the SRI established a Department for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (within 
which a Center of Counter-Terrorist Operational Coordination was created in 2004), as a 
permanent technical coordinator of the interacting agencies within the National System on 
Preventing and Combating Terrorism. The Center’s responsibilities include collection and 
analysis, as well as intervention. 33 
 
Membership Requirements by Collective Security Institutions 
 
One of the EU membership requirements was the implementation of Chapter 24 
provisions on justice and home affairs (border control, illegal migration, drug smuggling and 
money laundering, organized crime, police and judicial cooperation, and data protection), which 
DGIPI and SRI worked together to internalize and implement. STS carried out specific technical 
and operational missions together with the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior: a secure 
Wide Area Network was put in place serving the Department of Justice, and a speed of 34Mb/s 
was provisioned among the MIRA and the organizations within the ‘Integrated System for 
Border Security’ project (It is worth mentioning that the task was carried out before deadline). 
With regard to Chapter 19, Telecommunications and Information Technology, STS implemented 
the unique European number for emergency calls throughout Romania’s territory; in 2006, STS 
ensured the connection of the Gendarmerie and SRI’s Anti Terrorist Brigade. In compliance with 
UE requirements, STS collaborated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and 
implemented the Extranet communications network for the EU intelligence/information 




Information exchange/sharing is the principal tool of cooperation. Former SRI director 
Timofte stated in an interview that if, during a specific collection operation, SRI gets hold of 
information or documentation relevant to SIE or MOD, SRI will immediately inform and share 
that information with the respective agencies, and vice versa.35 In 2005 SRI furnished to 
authorities dealing with crisis situations over 150 documents and information on risks and 
vulnerabilities associated with the previous year floods, as well as 38 analyses on risks and 
vulnerabilities with regard to bird flu disease.36 In the same context, within 2005-2007 
timeframe, DGIPI sent 37 notes with information pertaining to grave economic and financial 
frauds and notified penal (judiciary) bodies for 12 suspect cases of money laundering, while the 
General Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (DGCCO) of the MIRA provided SRI 
counter terrorist center data and information collected on cases of terrorism. 37   
 
In general, classified information among ministries and/or other security institutions is 
ensured through a designated courier service, provided by SRI. Romania also uses NATO’s 
classified IT network: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is connected to this network but uses the 
courier service to disseminate relevant information to other ministries, which sometimes may 
cause delays in resolving urgent problems, thus affecting the effectiveness of the respective 
recipient ministry or agency.38 Likewise, as previously noted, receiving requested data by one 
institution from others may take up to 30 days. To overcome such challenges and delays, SRI 
requested CSAT in 2003 to create an Integrated Information System (SII), a gigantic data center 
for storage, handling and distribution of information gathered from all state institutions; all state 
institutions are obliged by law to deposit information in the SII (i.e. date when a citizen leaved 
Romania, what car brand a certain person has, a person’s personal email, tax information, etc).39 
SII is a huge computer network linked to a central unit hosted by SRI, to which state institutions 
input information continuously. Each agency has its own username and password, which enable 
access only to specific data or/and information. For example, the personnel of the Cadastre 
department cannot access information or data submitted by Border or Customs Police. Exception 
is SRI, which has unlimited access to all types of data and information. Despite blistering 
criticism by human rights’ groups and other civil society components (due to the lack of 
transparency of SII’s legal framework and lack of control mechanisms), essentially SII 
represents a useful tool of cooperation among security institutions in Romania. In compliance 
with the law, SRI cooperates with at least eleven state agencies. According to former SRI 
director Radu Timofte, SII made possible instant /immediate accession of certain information, 
which would otherwise last weeks. 40 It would be interesting to find out if Romanian IC benefits 
from additional intelligence and information sharing mechanisms, such as “intellipidia” or “a-
space” (which United States initiated to ease interagency cooperation, especially in the analysis 
realm), but so far, there has not been the case. 
 
Meetings, Joint Actions and Intervention 
  
Besides exchanging information, intelligence agencies participate in collaborative 
processes regarding the development of various national security documents. IC components 
participate in drafting security or defense related papers alongside other security organizations. 
For example, representatives from SRI, SIE, MOD and other security institutions have met 
several times to discuss and draft the national security strategy and the white book on national 
defense.  
 
IC components also participate, along with other security organizations, in field actions to 
avert or counter security threats. It is worth mentioning SRI’s support to DIICOT’s efforts to 
fight specific cases of organized crime (e.g. SRI provided DIICOT with proof, based on 
telephonic interceptions, that the former minister of communications and information technology 
was involved in the ‘file of privatizations’ organized crime operation).41 Likewise, it is worth 
noting DIICOT and SRI joined forces in 2006 to arrest a terrorist suspect, Florin Lesch, a 
Romanian converted to Islamism, who had been monitored by SRI since 2004, as he participated 
in various religious training camps in Romania and established connections with the Muslim 
Brotherhood group; Lesch’s car was found withexplosive materials, which he intended to use in 
order to blow up crowded cities in Romania as a revenge against Romania’s support to Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars.42 Also, in 2005, SRI was directly involved in countering implications and 
effects of crisis and emergency situations by making available to the National Committee for 
Emergency Situations over 300 antiterrorist brigade fighters and 8 navy seals, as well as the 
Delta air brigade and 71 ground transportation vehicles, including financial donations for the 
victims.43 Between 2005-2007 timeframe, DGIPI’s special forces acted together with other 
national organizations to repatriate the persons who were in Lebanon during the Lebanon 
conflict with Israel. 44   
 
An additional cooperation case is the creation of a ‘Crisis Cell’ formed during the 
journalists kidnapping in 2005, to deal with the crisis situation. 45 The Crisis Cell consisted of  
the president of Romania, the president’s advisor on political matters,  the prime-minister, the 
general prosecutor, the minister of foreign affairs, the SIE head and two deputy heads, the SRI 
head and deputy head, the minister of defense and the head of MOD intelligence directorate. 46 
According to the president Traian Basescu (who was directly involved in discussions with the 
representative of the kidnappers), the cooperation of the three above-mentioned intelligence 
services was excellent. 47 In particular, DGIA provided the most useful intelligence to the Crisis 
Cell.48 According to the Evenimentul Zilei newspaper, the success of the crisis cell components 
strengthened the population’s trust in state institutions.49 
 
Romanian intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been collaborating to ensure 
the security and safety of the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, which will bring together 
3000 high NATO/PfP officials (US delegation alone consisting of 1000 members) and over 3500 
journalists, as well as representatives from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Jordan, Afghanistan, 
UN, World Bank and EU. Based on a Memorandum of Understanding between Romania and 
NATO International Secretariat signed on September 21, 2007, security of NATO summit will 
be ensured by a Task Force (functioning within ad hoc NATO Summit Department (D-2008) of 
the MFA) consisting of SPP (coordinator), SRI, SIE, STS, ORNISS, MIRA and MOD, as well as 
NATO representatives.50 
   
Mutual Assistance, Education and Training 
 
The intelligence agencies have also provided one another mutual assistance as concerns 
personnel, education and training.  
 
As the only agency covering state telecommunications, which ensures the integrated 
communications needed for interagency cooperation, STS developed the configuration of 
communications support for connecting of central and local administrations to pan-European 
network s-Testa; also, for the CNI, STS ensured the installment, implementation and security 
accreditation of the information and communications system for the classified information 
management by the Office for Integrated Intelligence.51 In the same context, SRI, STS, SIE, 
MOD and MIRA have assisted SPP with staffing; because SPP does not have a specialized SPP 
education/training institution, it hired MOD personnel (for its driver and IT needs), MIRA 
personnel (for its legal needs), SIE/SRI personnel (for its intelligence needs) etc. The personnel 
hired from the DGIA or MIRA were participating in the operations theaters, the SRI in special 
units, and many of them had the highest performance in their institutions.  Moreover, SPP 
established a series of protocols of cooperation with MIRA, SRI and MOD to train SPP 
personnel in the three institutions’ education and training establishments (the first generation of 
driving, IT and pyrotechnic specialists will graduate in 2010, from MOD education 
institutions).52 STS, SIE and SRI personnel benefit from Romania’s Technical Military Academy 
(ATM) curricula, which educate both military and non-military intelligence personnel.53 The 
Police Academy "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" within the Ministry of Administration and Internal 
Affairs provides undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate education for police personnel and 
other national security system personnel (including intelligence professionals).54 SRI’s National 
Intelligence Academy (ANI) also offers courses (especially through the National Intelligence 
College) for other IC components. 
 
 
In regard to joint education and training, it is worth mentioning that the intelligence 
agencies participate together in foreign assistance education and training programs, conducted in 
Romania. Since 2004, the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), of the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, California, has conducted five programs tailored for the 
intelligence agencies’ needs (to include Intelligence Reform and Oversight, Terrorist Threat and 
Interagency Cooperation, Combating Terrorism, Intelligence Analysis etc.).  In addition to the 
organizers of the seminars, which were SRI (four seminar) and DGIPI (one seminar), the other 
major intelligence agencies (SIE, DGIA, STS, SPP) participated, as well as Parliamentarians and 
other security institutions (the Public Ministry, the National Bureau for Preventing and 
Countering Money Laundering (ONPCSB), General Prosecutor’s Office, President’s Office etc.). 
In general, participants seemed to be very willing to engage in the issues regardless of their rank 
or service, which indicates that Romanian agencies are interested in developing an effective 
interagency cooperation mechanism. 
 
 
The National Intelligence Community (CNI): the “Apple of Discord” or the “Gordian 
Knot” of Enhanced Interagency Cooperation? 
 
 The Creation of CNI 
 
In the aftermath of the journalist kidnapping crisis, and as a result of the fruitful 
cooperation among the crisis cell member, on 18 November 2005, CSAT set up Romania’s 
National Intelligence Community (CNI), CNI serves as a supreme intelligence coordination body 
(in charge of the activity of all current intelligence agencies), as well as an integrated structure 
(engaged in centralized processing of intelligence gathered by all its components, and 
distribution of analytical materials to the supreme bodies of authority, the offices of the President 
and the Prime Minister, and also the heads of corresponding commissions of the Parliament).55 
Romanian president Traian Basescu justified the CNI establishment with the need to corroborate 
and correlate all data and information provided by the intelligence agencies. 
 
The components of the National Intelligence Community include the following agencies: 
the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), Ministry of 
Defense General Directorate of Intelligence (DGIA), Ministry of Internal Affairs Directorate of 
Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI), and Ministry of Justice (MOJ). CSAT ensures the 
unitary organization and coordination of intelligence activities through a Coordination 
Committee for the national Intelligence Community, comprised of the following: national 
security advisors of the president and the prime minister, heads of SRI, and SIE, Minister of 
Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Administration and Internal Affairs, and the 
Minister of Justice. The Committee has the following attributes: ensures the coherence of actions 
needed for the integrated implementation of the National Security Strategy in the intelligence, 
counterintelligence and security fields; endorses and proposes the draft National Plan of 
Intelligence Priorities elaborated by the Operative Council and forwards for approval to the 
CSAT and president; set up the measures needed for the implementation of the courses of actions 
of the CNI, based on the strategic orientations set up by the CSAT; forward for CSAT approval 
the proposals for expenditure and procurement for all components of CNI; analyzes and solves 
specific problems of cooperation and collaboration among the CNI components; ensures 
harmonization and complementarity of actions or operations pertaining to intelligence in country 
and abroad, as well as development of cooperation with NATO, EU partner intelligence 
counterparts and other foreign partners; approves periodical evaluations integrated of strategic 
level; and submits for approval to CSAT the needs for updating the legislation and other 
regulations in the field of national security as well as of intelligence agencies’ activities. The 
Consultative Council (composed of the heads of parliamentary control committees, 
representatives of the ministries and services with attributions in national security that do not 
belong to CSAT, NGOs and other authorities that can support national security) functions near 
the Coordinator Committee, which has the following attributions: formulates the needs of 
intelligence of the institutions it represents, needed for the implementation of the security 
strategies, policies and programs; communicates with the Office (to be addressed below) 
appreciations/evaluations related to the utility of the received intelligence/information, supports 
the implementation of the national security programs, makes available subject matter expertise 
and analytical consultancy necessary to the members of CNI, and facilitates the externalization 
(externalizarea) of ancillary or complementary activities of the CNI members. Council’s 
meetings are open to representatives of the academia, research and strategic studies institutions, 
public policies and NGOs. The Operative Council of the National Intelligence Community, 
consisting of national security adviser of the president, deputy heads of the SRI and SIE and the 
directors of DGIA and DGIPI, ensures cooperation and collaboration among the CNI 
components. The Council has the following attributions: ensures the implementation of the 
stipulations within the documents of intelligence planning, operative coordination and 
cooperation, such as strategies, programs and action plans on combating terrorism, proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, corruption and other transnational threats, plan 
of national intelligence priorities, general protocol of cooperation of intelligence institutions on 
national security matters, general protocol of cooperation for combating terrorism and other 
protocols or plans of cooperation among CNI members; and convenes on intelligence, 
counterintelligence and security operations and projects, in order to support certain national 
strategies, as requested by the Committee. The Office of Integrated Intelligence (headed by the 
state advisor within the national security department of the presidential administration and two 
deputies, and comprised of  personnel from the institutions members of the Operative Council)  
ensures the integrated planning and evaluation of intelligence and information needed to support  
national security strategies and politics, in that it plans the intelligence needs for national 
security, elaborates the National Scurity Intelligence  Bulletin and other integrated analyses for 
various CSAT members and other intelligence consumers.56 
 
Problems and Controversies regarding the CNI Establishment and Effectiveness 
 
The creation of the CNI generated a series of controversies and criticism by the prime 
minister, current and former politicians and public authorities, as well as representatives of 
NGOs and civil society.  
 
The main issue is the shabby legal basis for the creation of CNI; critics argue that CNI 
cannot function without the modification of laws on organization and functioning of CSAT on 
the one hand, and on the CNI components, on the other hand. Although both deputy Ion Stan and 
former deputy Razvan Ionescu (also head of the parliamentary committee during Iliescu’s second 
term) expert within the Regional Security and Cooperation Association "Alliance" consider the 
creation of an intelligence community imperative, they point out that the Law number 415 of 
2002 does not specify that CSAT can set up or organize new structures, hence the CSAT 
decision was illegal. On the same note, Ion Stan states that the laws on the organization and 
functioning of each CNI component stipulate the independence and autonomy of the said 
services versus being part and parcels of a national intelligence community. Moreover, both 
personalities indicate that CSAT’s decision ignored the parliament in that CNI was not set up by 
law; since CSAT’s structures are established by law (adopted by the Romanian Parliament), and 
creating new structures is conditioned by Parliament’s decision (through a law) not by CSAT (or 
even government) resolutions, CSAT substitutes itself to the legislature.57  
 
There is also the problem of violation of the principle of separation of powers in state in 
that the Consultative Council includes members of the Parliament’s intelligence oversight 
committees, who cannot belong to executive structures unless stipulated by a Parliament’s 
resolution and not CSAT’s decisions.58 
 
The existence and effectiveness of parliamentary control of CNI’s activities is also 
problematic. According to Ion Stan, if it is not explicitly stipulated in the CNI decision, the 
parliamentary control may not exist and, thus, there will always be the suspicion that CNI could 
release information which could be used against political adversaries. On the other hand, the 
inclusion of members of Parliamentary oversight committees in the Consultative Council could 
jeopardize the objectivity of the legislative oversight of the each CNI participant institution. 59 
 
Other controversies include the following: the problem of redundancy between CNI and 
CSAT (in critics’ view, CNI’s Coordinating Committee duplicates and even surpass CSAT’s 
attributions); the lack of grounds for including certain members in the CNI subsidiaries (in 
critic’s view, the presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice - who do not 
have any intelligence service under their subordination - is not justified); the uncertainty 
regarding CNI’s budget (critics question where the funding for CNI comes from – the 
Presidential Administration or each intelligence agency?); and, the security clearance (in critics’ 
opinion, the presence of civil society representatives and other experts raise serious issues 
regarding the observance of Law number 182 of 2002 on access to classified information (strict 
secret and strict secret of high importance). In addition, critics argue CSAT’s decision did not 
solve the problem of reducing the number of intelligence agencies. Razvan Ionescu suggest it is 
worth creating a CNI based on the ‘classical model’ of internal intelligence agency, foreign 
intelligence agency and a military intelligence agency, with all the other structures as parts of 
one of the three intelligence agencies, which would also reduce the existing budgetary 
expenditures.60  
 
Moreover, as previously stated, national security (and intelligence in particular) has 
always represented an ‘Apple of Discord’ between the prime minister and the president, and 
many viewed the creation CNI as a ‘trick’ to increase President’s control over the intelligence 
services, to the detriment of the Prime Minister.61 
 
Hopefully, when the Parliament eventually adopts the national security law package 
(which includes a CNI law) skepticism toward CNI may disappear. In compliance with the draft 
CNI law (prepared by the Government) CNI would not respond before the president but will be 
subjected to legislative control, and its head would be appointed by the president but at the 
suggestion /proposal of the prime minister.62 Also, CNI’s coordination through the CSAT, which 
includes the President, the Prime Minister and a number of Ministers, decreases the risk of being 
Basescu’s ‘hijacking’ of the intelligence community. And, perhaps, the prime minister’s ‘center 
for situations’ (which grants the Prime Minister access to intelligence analyses and reports of the 
agencies without prior passage through the CNI) 63 could as well alleviate the conflict between 
the two political powers in Romania.  
 
Furthermore, according to Marius Oprea, the prime minister’s advisor on security issues 
and the representative of the prime minister in the CNI, CNI is not an extra intelligence service, 
because it does not have any operative attributions, but in reality, a group for intelligence 
analysis and synthesis which centralizes the intelligence received from all CNI members into one 
integrated analysis bulletin, for the decision makers. From this standpoint, CNI’s activity is 
useful, because it eliminates potential contradictions among services on specific topics and 
subjects, which would work toward finding a common denominator, as well as generates a 
professional versus unfair competition. Nevertheless, Marius Oprea still considers a CNI organic 
law approved by the legislature is imperative, to avoid CNI politicization and stipulate 
parliamentary control.64   
 
Yet, CNI Seems to Serve Its Purpose 
 
Notwithstanding, CNI’s ultimate purpose is to increase effectiveness and professionalism 
of the intelligence services, by eliminating parallelisms, overlapping and waste of human and 
material resources. In compliance with the National Security Strategy, CNI ensures a functional 
partnership of the intelligence agencies, (which get to preserve their specific roles and missions 
in parallel with a better coordination of their strategic activities), the interoperability among all 
domestic intelligence and security organizations, as well as increased effectiveness of collection, 
processing and dissemination of intelligence.65 
 
Despite the problems regarding legitimacy and transparency, the CNI started to function on 
December 7, 2005, when the Office of Integrated Intelligence structure was established, together 
with its personnel (analysts transferred from all CNI components), while on January 3, 2006 the 
first intelligence bulletin was elaborated. This office, whose director likes to call “laboratory”, 
functions very well, thanks to a superior information technology system, established and 
implemented within a month since the creation of the office (consisting of various software and 
communications equipment, and protected by specific IT security system). The bulletin has ten 
pages, consisting of raw information on several issues and detailed analyses of up to three of the 
issues, which the office considers of importance for the decision makers. Progressively, the daily 
bulletin and analyses on various hot topics have been complemented by special syntheses on the 
evolvement of specific activity. Up to 80 percent of the information included in the bulletins is 
open source information. The Office’s personnel are professional analysts, specialized on various 
regions and fields, including Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, some of them former officers who had 
previously participated in missions in those regions and became familiarized with the areas and 
customs. CNI personalizes the flow of information to the intelligence consumers and decision 
makers. Additionally, CNI expanded the dissemination from CSAT members to Parliamentary 
Committees, who receive a weekly brief (strict secret) with all information they need. Through 
the annual plan of intelligence priorities for intelligence agencies, approved by CSAT, the CNI 
ensures duplications and overlapping are avoided between CNI and individual briefs from each 
service. 66 According to the Integrated Office director, the intelligence consumers receive the 
intelligence summary daily by 1000 am. 
 
 
REACHING OUT TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND POPULATION 
 
 
Opening toward the civil society and NGOs was perhaps the most difficult cooperative 
effort undertaken by the intelligence agencies. Establishing connections with think tanks, NGOs, 
academia and the media was hindered by a mutual mistrust: IC considered the civil society in 
general and the media in particular, sensationalist and incapable of handling national security 
information professionally, while the civil society considered that the intelligence community did 
not undertake the democratic reform seriously, and lacked transparency and accountability. In 
spite of a relatively robust legal framework regarding transparency (including a Freedom of 
Information Act), occasionally intelligence agencies would invoke national security for not 
disclosing information to the civil society. And, even though civil society would sometimes win 
a case to access information (on the wiretaps authorized by the general prosecutor for a ten year 
period) it could not obtain said piece of information (as the prosecutor ignored the court order); 
despite the fact that the NGOs filed a civil suit against the prosecutor and the institutions were 
penalized with a fine per each day for withholding of information, only a media scandal 
(covering on the huge number of wiretaps authorized and the names of the persons under 
surveillance), helped release the information.67 
 
Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have eventually established partnerships with public 
authorities, members of academia, NGOs, journalists, analysts, and students, to increase their 
awareness of the need for effective intelligence in Romania. Collaboration with civil society 
have included, among other: the development of the Monitoring Exercise of Instruments and 
Mechanisms for Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Romania, by the 
Parliamentary Committee for Defense, Public Order and National Security of the House of 
Deputies and EURISC foundation, with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF); the NGOs participation in debating laws pertaining to national security or 
government’s transparency; access to IC press releases and websites; the possibility for 
journalists to interview intelligence officials; participation of NGOs, media and other civil 
society groups in joint meetings with IC members. In addition, SRI leadership has mentioned the 
possibility of using media, NGOs, and academia representatives for prevention of specific 
national security threats and challenges.68 Moreover, in compliance with Romania’s strategy of 
combating terrorism, which stipulates cooperation with the civil society, the intelligence 
agencies have established joint programs to train the population on national security. To this end, 
it is worth mentioning the campaign entitled ‘Terrorism … Near Us’, conducted by SRI with the 
support of EURISC and other non governmental institutions, which enables SRI to travel to 
various high schools and universities in Romania to train the students on what the security 
threats are, what can SRI and its anti terrorist brigade can do to counter these threats, and what 
the population can do to help the intelligence community avert such threats. 
 
 
COOPERATION AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL  
 
Romania has been particularly interested in cooperating with international partners; 
joining the European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions, and establishing a partnership with 
the United States were some of the reasons. But, at first, cooperation with foreign countries was 
difficult and Romania remained isolated from the West, as many NATO and Western 
counterparts were reluctant to share information with IC personnel, who had previously worked 
for the Securitate; One of the grave problems in Romanian IC transition to democracy was the 
continuity of former Securitate personnel in both the IC and other government positions. 
NATO/EU more or less ordered Romania to dismiss these personnel to be considered for 
membership in their organizations.69 Paradoxically, however, in the Foreign Intelligence 
Service’s situation, those who worried about the retirement of the former Securitate personnel 
were SIE’s partners. Former SIE director explained this by arguing that a relationship with a 
partner agency requires years and becomes personal, in that agents know each other very well 
and trust each other, 70 and any breach in such relationship may affect the effectiveness of 
cooperation.  
 
Cooperation has strengthened after Romania started to undertake the overhauling its 
security and intelligence agencies more seriously (which led to NATO membership), establish 
agreements of cooperation with counterparts abroad, and especially, after Romania became an 
effective contributor with troops (including intelligence) to different peace operations and war on 
terror missions, together with foreign partners. 
 
Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation 
 
All Romanian IC members have established specific intelligence sharing and exchange 
mechanisms with foreign partners, through various bilateral and multilateral channels, stemmed 
from common preoccupations, needs and perceptions, as well as shared threats. Cooperation is 
ensured through information sharing, mutual support, visits and joint training. 
 
A few examples of bilateral cooperation include the following: SRI and SIE currently 
cooperate with numerous agencies from all over the world (more than eighty in case of SRI and 
135 in case of SIE), including CIA, FBI, MI6; STS cooperates with various counterpart 
organizations of neighboring countries and NATO members (Romanian special 
telecommunications system (also used by Portugal and Lithuania) was later implemented by 
Ukraine),  SPP collaborates with U.S. Secret Service and France’s guard and protection service, 
as well as with the Canadian counterparts (during the Francophone countries’ summit in 
Bucharest in 2006, the Canadian government provided Romania with 500 radio stations and 
other modern communication and command technical devices) DGIA collaborates with the US 
NSA.71 DGIA has partnered with several US intelligence agencies, resulting in being connected 
to the NSA espionage system which operates SIGINT network. To this end, CSAT adopted 
several classified decisions to endorse the system of communications monitoring through 
Satellite – MONSAT and to procure and install on Romania’s territory of special equipment for 
NSA’s SIGINT network. The MONSAT equipment was bought by NSA with the financial 
support by U.S. government. Also, CSAT adopted another classified decision in 2006 on 
installing on Romania’s territory of SIGINT equipment of the Intelligence and Security Service 
of the Netherlands. All these efforts are aimed to increase collaborative intelligence with NATO 
allies.72 An FBI office opened in 2001 in Bucharest. 
 
A few examples of multinational cooperation mechanisms, include the following: 
Romania cooperates and shares intelligence with other members within NATO, EU, SECI Center 
for Combating Trans Border Crime, European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENSIA), European Police Office (EUROPOL), International Bomb Data Center, Balkan 
Communication Network and the like.  
 
Romanian IC has organized a series of meetings and workshops on security matters, such 
as the NATO-Ukraine Working Group Meeting in Bucharest, in October 2007, which focused on 
democratic civilian control of the security institutions and intelligence reform. 73 Romanian IC 
has been in permanent contact with the NATO Office of Security (NOS), which is handling the 
coordination, monitoring and implementation of the Atlantic Alliance’s security policy. One of 
the most recent meetings took place between the SRI and NOS from in January 2007, and 
addressed the preparation and organization of the April 2008 Alliance Summit in Bucharest, as 
well as SRI’s involvement in ensuring the security of the Summit.74  
 
As president for 2007 of thee Balkan Communications Network (a security cooperation 
mechanism initiated by Turkey, which gathers together 22 governmental and nongovernmental 
security institutions from 13 countries), Romania hosted the The Annual Conference of Balkan 
Communication Network entitled “EU and NATO Acting Together in SEE – The Role of the 
NGOs Networks”, in June 2007.75 Romanian IC representative to the Balkan Communication 
Network is the SRI, through its Center for Information for Security Culture. 
 
In February 2008, SRI’s organized the sixth meeting of the International Bomb Data 
Center in Bucharest, which got together representatives of over 20 states engaged in the fight 
against terrorism, including South Africa, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgia, Colombia, 
United Arab Emirates, Philippines, Spain, Great Britain, Spain, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, 
US, and Hungary. The Center Working Group is an international organism of cooperation among 
governmental agencies engaged in preventing and combating illegal utilization of explosives. 76 
 
The SECI Regional Center successfully fulfilled a drug trafficking case (Operation 
“RING”), which involved a Turkish criminal organization active in Romania and Turkey, aiming 
to sale drugs in the Netherlands, the destination country. Through cooperation and information 
sharing between Romanian and Turkish law enforcement agencies, and with the assistance and 
support of the German and Dutch law enforcement agencies, at mid December 2007, all the 
intelligence gathered urged immediate intervention, thus at the Turkish-Bulgarian border, the 
Turkish authorities seized 58 kg of heroin (hidden in a Turkish truck), which resulted in 
immediate arrests, in both Romania and Turkey. The Turkish officers detained 11 persons, while 
the Romanians arrested the head of the criminal organization and two lieutenants.77  
 
Romania has been part of the European Police Office (the EU’s criminal intelligence 
agency) since 2004. As member, Romania has participated in regular meetings with EUROPOL 
and facilitated information and intelligence sharing with the European Police Office on crime-
related issues.78 The National EUROPOL Unit, established within the Romanian Ministry of 
Interior in 2004, ensures the liaison with the EUROPOL, easing the information flow between 
Romania and EUROPOL members. Between January and October 2006, for instance, the 
National Unit enabled the exchange of 2,571 operational messages (644 on forged credit cards, 
516 on fraud and smuggling, 494 on terrorism, 414 on drug trafficking, 200 on human 
trafficking, 181 on currency forgery and 122 on illegal migration) among Romania, Spain, 
Germany, Italy, France and Hungary.79 
 
Additional cooperative endeavors include: the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Symposium of 
the International Intelligence Forum, held in United States in 2006 and Romania in 2007, which 
gather together intelligence representatives from Bulgaria, Romania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and the 
United States, to address challenges to the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions; the International 
Seminar entitled “Combating Terrorism. NATO and Trans-Atlantic Dimension”, held in 
Bucharest in 2002, witch gathered together representatives of intelligence and law enforcement 
organizations from various NATO and PfP countries, including Romania, United States, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Albania. During this meeting, the Assistant Legal Attaché of the United States 
Embassy in Romania expressed his appreciation regarding the excellent work between the FBI 
office and Romanian intelligence and law enforcement organizations.80 
 
Participation in Cooperative Operations 
 
Romania also contributes to international peace, stabilization, and reconstruction 
operations in cooperation with allies and partners: in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, with 
National Intelligence Cells (RONIC) integrated in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) intelligence formation; in Afghanistan, with a Detachment 
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence within the International Security Assistance Force in 
Afghanistan (ISAF); and in Iraq, with a Military Intelligence Detachment in the Multinational 
Division Center South. Romania has a liaison officer integrated within the coalition intelligence 
center in Tampa, Florida, to do collection and analysis, as well as to coordinate the troops 
participating in ‘Enduring Freedom.’81 
 
Romania is one of the few NATO members capable to organize, prepare and deploy in 
operations theaters complex intelligence structures to include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), UAV, multisource analysis capabilities collections, and, as well, 
to ensure the specialized logistic support (specific communications, technical devices 
maintenance, and training and rotation of personnel). In 2003, the Special Detachment Iraq was 
established composed of a SIGINT structure focused on specialized/ focused collection missions 
such as: internal and external political environment, area leaders and their 
motivations/incentives, economic factors, cultural and religious factors, ethnic relations, 
organizations and institutions active in the region , police and paramilitary forces, terrorist 
groups and other organizations. In September 2005, the Intelligence Cell in Kandahar was 
completed by a SIGINT component for collection through radio monitoring of the terrorist 
groups in Afghanistan and its neighbors.82 
 
HUMINT capablities are highly desired within the Atlantic Alliance, and Romania is one 
of the few Allies possessing excellent HUMINT assets. In Iraq, for example, effective Coalition 
forces’ HUMINT collection operations were possible, among other things, to the closeness 
between Romanian and Iraqi people (going back in history), which made Iraqis more open to the 
Romanian troops than to the other Coalition forces.83 
 
Likewise, SPP officers ensure the protection and guard of various UN officials in Sudan 
Iraq, and Afghanistan. Given the SPP professionalism and expertise, the United Nations Under-
Secretary-General for Safety and Security, Sir David Veness, was interested in establishing a 
Center of Excellence in Romania, in support of UN activities, which will have a training 
component, as well as a research and development component. First courses of actions toward 






Establishing a functional cooperation process among intelligence agencies and other 
national security institutions has been problematic in many long established democracies: the 
United States’ intelligence organizations have tried so since the early 1940s while France’s 
intelligence agencies since early 1990s. Moreover, despite the reorganization process in the 
United States after 9/11, many argue that the intelligence system is yet to be an effective 
community.85 Instituting cooperation and collaboration among intelligence in Romania has been 
even more difficult. As has been the case for intelligence reform in general, the evolution of 
interagency cooperation in Romania has been hampered by a series of challenges, including 
legacies of the Securitate, bureaucratic obstacles, protracted scandals and rivalries among 
intelligence agencies, attempts to politicize intelligence, conflicts between political figures and 
the like. Of late, however, as the number of ‘unknowns’ in the global ‘security equation’ 
mounted, the intelligence agencies have understood they serve a common purpose - the security 
of the country and its citizens (even if, by law, they have different responsibilities).  
 
The creation of the controversial CNI, which appears to have raised more questions than 
answers with regard to interagency cooperation, in that there is no statutory law for it and it lacks 
transparency and accountability, seems to be serving its objective. The supporters of the CNI 
asserted that the CSAT’s decision to create the community has been the ‘most important decision 
taken in the field of national security in the last fifteen years.’86  Obviously, the establishment of 
such a community has been necessary to instate a fair competition among services and provide 
the decision makers with integrated intelligence briefs/products (which is actually happening, 
through the Office for Integrated Intelligence). Likewise, since the CSAT is the major 
intelligence consumer, creating the CNI within the Council made perfect sense. Even so, CNI 
needs an organic/statutory law approved by the parliament and needs to be under democratic 
control.  
 
Asked in an interview in 2006, whether or not there still existed an unfair competition 
among intelligence agencies in Romania (aimed particularly to gain the Romanian president’s 
trust), Claudiu Saftoiu, former presidential advisor and SIE director, claimed that there was not 
the case anymore. As well, the director of the Guard and Protection Service asserted that the 
‘communication’ between SPP and the other intelligence agencies highly improved since he took 
office. 87 
 
At international level, Romania’s intelligence community has changed its status from a 
‘pariah’ to a trustworthy ally; reiterated commendation of the professionalism and effectiveness 
of the Romanian IC by its international counterparts could not be overlooked. SPP, whose 
officers ensure the protection of UN officials in Sudan and Afghanistan has repeatedly received 
appreciation and praise from the United Nations, proving the professionalism and seriousness of 
the Romanian IC abroad. 88 Likewise, SRI and SIE are viewed as ones of the most reliable and 
credible services by NATO, EU and other intelligence agencies. 
 
 
In conclusion, Romania has made major strides in developing an effective intelligence 
system, through, among other measures, the development of specific coordination and 
cooperation mechanisms; the Romanian IC cooperative actions alongside national law 
enforcement institutions, judiciary, and civil society, as well as with international intelligence 
systems, have proven that ‘one for all, all for one’ approach matters when it comes to national, 
regional or global security.  
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